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MORAL ORIGINS AND THE NUB OF ETHICS
BV r.RUCE \\'. BROTHERSTON
IT has often appeared to the present writer that the moral
phil-
osophers have dealt too cavalierly with the materials of early
hiuiian life. Of course none are so well awarei as they that the
diflcrence between tribal or national standards is a relative matter.
They would not, as less well-informed men might, think of basin^^
upon this difference the charc^e that another people lacked moral
consciousness. Yet the suspicion may be justified that the extreme
difference between our own ways and the ways of uncivilized men
is iaraielv the basis of the doctrine that moral consciousness is absent
or merelv "in prerm" among them. This error, if it exists, is hidden
in a well-conceived method. The method presents the nub of ethics
as it appears "to the enlightened moral consciousness", and takes
this as a criterion in the study of moral origins. The presence or
absence of moral consciousness or the degree of its force is measured
bv the presence or absence or the degree of force in early life of this
"nub of ethics.^
It is notorious that the views of moralists differ widely. But as
to this nub of ethics there is general agreement. As psychologists
and sociologists, moral philosophers may have different ways of
accounting for volition and responsibility. But all agree that volun-
tariness is what gives conduct its ethical equality. And volition is
of course individual volition . Hence courses of action for which
individuals are responsible are the subject-matter of ethics. But
even the casual reader of the customs and beliefs of early men re-
^Westermarck, TJic Origin and Development of Moral Ideas. Vol. I, p.
202; Chaps VIII-X, esp. p. 524 f. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution, Vol II,
pp. 135 f, 137, note. McDougal, Society Psychology, p. 238 f.
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members that any notion of individnal responsibility played a very
small part among- them and he is prepared to hear that moral con-
sciousness is absent or vaguely 'in g-erm".
But if he be one who has yielded to the fascination of strange
customs and has read farther, he will remember cases of passion-
ate loyalty among savage peoples ; of the Greek Menoikeus immo-
lating himself to save his city ;- of Oedipus wishin^g to be exiled to
remove the "imcleanness" from Thebes ; or of an Indian brave who
accepts a forlorn hope to save a contingent of his tribe. One reads
the Libation Bearers of Aeschylus and finds himself at once in the
atmosphere of Central Africa or Polynesia and at the same time in
an intense life of moral praise and blame. One wonders whether
Aeschylus, immersed a? he was in the Chthonic religion of Greek
peasants, as nearly primitive as is Central Africa today, has read
all this intense moral feeling into the tradition, and has not truly
interpreted for us—no doubt omitting many external things that
were confused in it—the inwardness of early life. Greek tradition
descends from the period of barbarism. Yet the dramatic power
of Euripides is achieved while presenting these traditions just as
they are, bringing out their human relations in full force of passion-
ate good and evil, passionate praise and blame.
When one is told by the moralists that custom, which is the
ethics of early man, was wholly external ; as though it were obeyed
without anv force of inward approval, merely from superstitious and
wholly unfounded fear, one feels that something has been over-
looked ; that there is something- at fault in the usual method of study-
ing moral origins. But on the contrary, it may be the case that the
Greek dramatists are true interpreters of the traditions of their early,
ancestors. Doul:)tless they made analyses of human situations not
made bv their fathers, as they were not made by the masses of their
contemporaries. But their powerful handling of the materials of
tradition merely served to bring out the force present in those tra-
ditions and in the experience of their creators.
The thesis of this paper is that the materials of early human life
have been in this regard wholly misread, because a too radical in-
dividualism has mislead moral philosophers as to the nub of ethics.
It will begin with a study of primitive man's world-view in which
it vvill attempt to make appear the genuine moral consciousness in-
2Cox, 'flic Afyfholnt/y of the Aryan Nations, p. 415. Euripides, The
Phoenician J'irgins, 990 ff.
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\-oh'ed in social or group responsibility : to show why the notion of
individual responsibility did not at first enter; and to suggest the
part it later played. Next l)y tracing the development of the concept
of moral evil in Greek thought, we will make clear the inextricable
relation of individual responsibility to social or group res])onsibility.
Finallv bv a very brief outline of the development of the concept
of the good in Hebrew experience, traced from the primiti\e world-
view to the teachings of Jesus, we will make a]^])ear how the re-
ligious motive, really the mnti\e of social responsibility, maintained
itself as the ground of ethics, carrying individual res|)onsibilit\' with
it as an implication, at first obscure and at last fully clear. TTence
we will maintain that indi\idual responsibility is not the nub of
ethics : that while it is inevitabl\' involved in social resjionsibilty,
it can never be clearly and distinctly separated from it. P.ut even
while, as in the ])rimiti\e world-view, it lies within it in a wholly
confused wa\-, groui^ responsibility manifests still a genuine and
full-powered moral consciousness.
Since Codrington ]:)resentcd the ^^lelanesian conception of uiaiia
in 1891, there has issued among scholars a tendency to believe in the
existence of a preanimistic world-view. The following in.terpre-
tation of this primitive JJ'cltaiiscIiainnK/ is ofl:'ered as that which best
synthesises the entire field of facts. It is usuall\- suiJ]DOsed that
what seemed most real to earlv man was the distinct and solid par-
ticular thing—human body or natural oliject. This bod\' or object,
through experience of dreams or visions, had come to be "doubled"
bv an anima or soul. But this view is a preconception on the part
of modern students rather than a result of the study of the facts.
Such a study shows rather that the thing most real to early man is
something he cannot see. It is a reality inward to the w^orld in gen-
eral as a man's psvchical nature is inward to his body. Indeed it is
universal in primitive man's little world. But however universal,
this reality has not been conceived by the abstracting intelligence.
It is the immediate issue of his own psychical organization and it
has the vivid and persistent reality of spontaneous impulse. It
would never occur to early man to doubt its presence in the ritual
observances of his people, the awful ]^ower of natural storms, or the
dread passion of social upheavals. We ha\e here perhaps a fact
of foundational significance in the study of human nature. The
common sense view of realitv h,as not always been the common sense
view of later ages when social atomism has prevailed. It did not
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always fasten upon the unit of sense perception. It has always been
ingenuous enough, but man's first sense of reality followed the lines
of inner rather than of outer perception ; and it issued in the concep-
tion of a vital, psychic, dynamic reality felt with varying potency
through the flow of his life. It found its "substance" not in solidity,
nor in individual distinctness, but in so tenuous a matter that it
could flow through all solidities like ions. It is the solidary, inwaru
reality of kin, clan, tribe, and natural environment, holding all things
together in the real world of his experience. The labored conception
of a unity, presupposed in human experience, which issued in mod-
ern philosojDhy to correct the subjectivity of Berkeleyan idealism,
was native, though in absolute naivete, in the world-view of primi-
tive man."^
PfUt this immediate reference of man's experience to the univer-
sal did not take the arrangement and management of his world out
of man's hand. ]\[an"s ability to afl:ect his own world and life was
conceived to lie in his ability to operate this power through the
discovery of systems of interconnections which it followed and a
manipulation of these. This brings us at once into the realm of re-
ligious and "magic" ritual. It was customary thirty years ago to
explain magic as primitive science. Apparently the "power" that
operated in magic was taken to be the force of causal relationship
or of logical implication. This force was thought to have been felt
in a wholly vague way by the primitive mind and to have been con-
fused therefore with the more obvious psychological associations of
similarity and continuity. But it becomes evident upon study of the
sources that man's power to adapt himself to physical forces and
physical things by observation of their causes and implications
plaved no dominant part. It was not that early man was deficient in
this power. Its prosaic progress was retarded, and greatly retarded,
as was also his sense of individual responsibility, not by logical or
moral inca]:)acity, but by his systematic and ])ersistent attemj)ts to
operate vliis more profound and elemental force. This force was
primitive man's reality sense. It was the total force of his psychical
organization, the impulsive objectification of his own nature. It was
still without analysis and hence it was conceived as being both matter
and force unbounded. It flashed in with concentrated power upon
"For another view, see Hopkins, History of Rrlic/ioii, p 18. But Flopkins
takes the view-point that the savage thinks "concretely". He has not snt^ciently
felt the force of the shape-shifting nature of the savage world, whose con-
stant realities are general solidarities.
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any avenue of relationship that might more or less strikingly pre-
sent itself to a wholly inexperienced intelligence. It presents strong
evidence, as against the usnal theor}- of the instincts, of an innate
organization of man's total psychical equipment, which shows itself,
amidst the confusion of objective events, in a want, of all wants
the most specifically human, and one just as persistent and definite
as hunger or sex,—the prophetic restlessness, the ethical penchant
for social integration, the philosophical desire for universal integra-
tion, for unity, the religious want for God. This deepest force in
primitive human life was '"the Presence" in earliest religious appre-
hension. It v\'as nearer than breathing and closer tlian hands or feet.
It itself was immediately known. Its consequences alone were oc-
cult. It was a wind blowing where it listed. It focusserl like storm
forced at ditlercnt times and places, and common men could not tell
whence it came or whither it went. So was e^xry one born of this
spirit and every place where it focusscd its power. Rut such a man
became potent with esoteric knowledge and power to bless or ban.
Similar were sacred spots where it was concentrated and localized.
It was thus that the later animism and theism were derived from this
earlier religion. The plenitude of this theoplasm, concentrated in
sacred places, constitutes the vague aniconic deities of pre-theistic
times, and that in persons, the semi-divine heroes. It is likely
through an interplay of these two that personal gods are conceived.
Hence it is not the case that magic was an early science. It was
not the case that the loose associational connections were confused
with the more binding relations whose tracing constitutes science.
The world-view of early man is not to be apprehended by any such
comparison with the modern mind. It is to be apprehended only in
the apprehension of their sense of a ubiquitous reality, holding all
in unity, ready to strike across any relation however insignificant.
Indeed for primitive man to discover anv relation whatever.—to
have any connection in thought or things become a distinct matter
of interest, was to discover a natural avenue of this potency, this
real identity under difference. x\ny sort of similarity, anv sort of
contiguity is sufificient to become an evidence of reality,—of identity
in difference,—lines u]:ion which potent operations of the unseen
reality may run. Thus while this is ubiquitous, universal, it is pres-
ent in all sorts of changing qualities and degrees,—a changing pat-
tern of utmost intricacy, as it follows the lines of these connections
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which intrench upon each oth.er because vaguely observed and car-
ried be_\ond their proper scope.
Now the significant matter in primitive man's world-view is just
this continuity of the real. At every turn of the data one is struck
with early man's feeling of solidarit\-. There is evidence on every
side of a sense of real connections binding apparently distinct things
and events. The contagion of "uncleanness" and of sacredness,
closelv connected, the inner Ijond of kinship acquired l)y birth or by
partaking of the blood of the kin, or even of common food, these
connections,—these undercurrents of reality all referring to the
same underlying theoplasm, dominate the life of early man. The}'
are the inner power for which custom merely fixes the lines of opera-
tion. Jevons pointed out long ago that the contagion of taboo is not
conceived through an error but is an a priori jjrinciple."' E(|ually so
is the bond of kinship and the force of curses and blessings. They
are all forms of the same thing. They are the sanctions of custom
and the source of its authority and they give it its (7 priori aspect.
This obsession of solidarity, which found real connections in
every chance relation, militated against any proper conce]:)tion of the
relations of individuals and particulars. It is exceedingly import-
ant to notice this ob\-erse side of early man's world-view. The
world of particulars is a world of lesser reality capable of all kinds
of metamorphoses. Its changes proceed upon connections inwardly
felt. Hence all sorts of real relationships and all sorts of merging
are possible. A man and a crow may ]:)erfectly well be of the same
kin, anrl (he rain and the hail may perfectly well be in the same
class as the crow and the man." Particular things and persons may
shape-shift indefinitely—from old woman to beautiful maiden, or to
serpent, or to werewolf. The identity of such forms is an inward
matter discovered on traditional lines. The individual is merged in
his kin and in his environment. There is a continuity in which each
individual and each particular has significance according as he or it
is tl'ie locus of a greater or lesser concentration of the continuous
reality of the universe. Always submerging the individual and the
particular and constitutiiig all that is real in any person or thing is
a superrealm from which the tril)al custom gets its whole force and
the lines of whose operation it marks. It is a cosmic power. To call it
a transhuman reality were to make a distinction between humanity
Introduction to the History of RcViii'wu. p. 88.
""'See Diirkhcim. Tlic Eh-mcutary Forms of Rclif/inus Life, p. 141 ff.
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and the workl which early man ne\er made. It is a hvi^erreahp,
including- all particulars and constitutin.g a cosmic unity solidary with
the central current of human impulse and emotion. A fluidity of
perception following lines of a continuity not conceived intellectually
but arrived at upon the basis of impulse and emotion characterized
the world-view of early man. The universal is the real. The par-
ticular is appearance.
\\'e arc now in a position to understand primitive man's con-
ception of good and evil. They had one source together in the
same realitv and the same cosmic power. The difference between
them belongs to the realm of relations among individual and particu-
lar persons and things. The theoplasm focusses in advantageous
and in disadvantageous combinations of particular things. It may
follow lines of beneficence to the kin, or it may break out in dis-
aster. TUit this real Presence is one. It is beyond good and evil,
which lie in the connections it finds to take, connections wdiich man
himself may determine. Saccr means both sacred and polluted, and
ay is the root from which derive both ayo? ]~)ollution and dyros holy.
The same ])Ower operates for blessing- or for cursing, for good or for
evil according to outer forms that may be manipulated bv enemy or
friend.
From the beginning men believed that if the group strictly fol-
lowed the customs, particularly observing the rites and offsetting
the ma^gic of enemies, reality would operate in all beneficence. If
not. any evil might fall. The lines men open or leave open toward
good or toward evil are the lines the hidden force takes. It lies
with men— with all men in following the customs—but especially
with the directors of the ritual, to open good or evil ways for sacred
power. Because the Tao of man in China does not implicitly imi-
tate the Tao of heaven, the forces of the universe operate for evil
to mankind. The Rita in India is at once the ritual and the order
of nature and it is some breach in the former that brings disturbance
in the latter. In Greek life the Real Presense has early been di-
vided up into a pantheon of distinctly personal gods and thus
particularity and evil wdth it had been carried back into the realm
of the real. The early thinkers were baffled by this escapeless fusion
of good and evil among the gods. The philosophers repudiated the
gods altogther, excluded impulse and emotion in which the gods
had their origin, and made the cjuest for reality a noetic pursuit.
The dramatists were unwilling to go so far. It remained a baffling
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problem to them. It was perhaps with this prol)lem that the Bacchae
of Euripides w^as intended to deal It presents the real presence of
deity as, on the one hand, poetic inspiration and noble social passion
and, on the other, as mad intoxication and the frenzy of social chaos.
Both issue from deity, but according to the current of man's life.
Upon the action of Pentheus, the locus of social authority, depends
which shall prcAail. Repeatedly he is adjured,—by the priest,
Teriesius, by Cadman, and finally by the God, himself : "All may yet
be well". Euripides seems here to reflect the idea that good and
evil issue from one reality which takes different direction and qual-
ity according to the trend men give the social relations they con-
trol. If so he has returned with clear concepts to what is essentially
the attitude of the earliest human traditions.
The first traceable human situation had its passion for good and
against evil, its criterion for judging them and its methods for es-
caping the one and achieving the other. In total confusion of
particular and individual relations a normal moral consciousness was
working. As we have suggested, it was very force of moral con-
sciousness Avhich prevented an earlier analysis of relations betw'een
l^articulars in both the moral and the natural realms.
Let us see what was the extent of this confusion in the moral
sphere. In that "uncleanness" wliich arises out of sinster focussings,
sinister courses of the common rclitv nil the different aspects of
evil are present without distinction. We can separate its several
elements. First, natural evils which fall upon men out of unfor-
seen operations of natural laws. Second, evils which men enact but
without intent, which if intended would be genuine moral evil such
as the "sin" of Oedipus. Tliird, there are evils which the immediate
ageiit could not avoid but which common sense persists in calling
moral evil- -deeds wrought under passion that came upon the agent
out of larger circles of evil in which he was involved. Fourth, the
moral evil of the Aristotelian—what the individual could have avoid-
ed. These distinct matters are mingled together in utmost confusion.
Guilt and punishment, accident and design, sin and misfortune lie
undislinguished in a common ground of evil, to which primitive
man referred the whole force of his moral consciousness. Pro-
found moral loathing attached to any of its focussings.—to the in-
ner thouqht or to the outer object or act alike. Indians perform-
ing their purificatory rites, must refrain from thoughts of strife. The
inner thought is "unclean" in precisely the same way as the outer
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deed. There is no lack of inwardnesp. but a failure to distino-uish
inward and outward. Again the individual's voluntary misdeed is
"unclean" iust as the passionate or accidental evil in which he is
involved. There is no absence nor weakness of moral conscious-
ness : but rather the solidarity of the whole field of evil as of good is
so powerfully felt that moral fcelino-s rightly attached only to cer-
tain aspects of evil are indistinguishably attached to all.
AA'ith til is in mind it is not difficult to understand why scholars
have thought that auK^ng earlv men there has been no conception of
moral e\'il at all. or one onlv "implicit" ov "in germ", and that cus-
tom which prescribes the individual's conduct was a matter of merely
external rules sanctioned by superstitious fears. Tt is because the
individual nlnvs so slight a i~iart' in the world-view of early men,
whereas modern ethical thought is centered in the individual. The
enlightened moral consciousness lays all emphasis upon the im-
mediate aacnt and thereby does him vast injustice. The savage
mind was intent only on discovering the locus upon which a general-
ized moral evil had centered its baneful force. This is the point
:
it is the locus of a superparticular evil they are intent upon, rather
tha.n the agent of a ])articidar deed. The agent is passed over ex-
cept in case he is also the locus. I'pon that locus the guilt, the sin,
has fallen with its fluid power that can flow on any connection in-
fecting a whole citv and causing flood and earthquake and war. Tt
can even pass its contaf^'ifn ^'" <'^'' -'^-i<ions (^f time, making days
imclean. Tt is this which renders resentment at real agents strangely
slight in savage life. Resentment of a violent color fastens rather
on particular loci of evil. A man to whom an accident occurs may be
loathed, or a stone, or a beast. Tt is not the agent but the locus of
moral e\'il thai is important to early man.
Here is the key to the imderstanding of primitive ethics. Early
man was concerned with the control of evil conceived as a social and
indeed as a cosmic unity and is not concerned with the individual as
such. The social and cosmic falling of evil prevent him from per-
ceiving the true relation of the individual to evil. The control of
evil is a restoration of balance in the hyperrealm, making negative
sacredness to flow again in positive channels. The sinister focus
must be localized. The centre of danger must be dealt with.
Whether the locus of the loathed evil be another or oneself it must
be removed. Tt is significant that the agent of evil first reprobated
as agent is the magician who for private ends can disturb the balance
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of tlie hvperrealni and centre its forces for ill on man or group. He
is the first agent of moral evil. Every other sinner is merely a locus.
And the man of social praise is the man who can manipulate the
theoplasm for social good. The early priest is usually also chief.
A strong moral life is seen here in progress but in utmost con-
fusion of its elements.
To he sure the feeling of the significance of agency enters very
earl\- under the motive of justice to the individual, while yet the all-
imjiortant control of superindividual evil in society is kept secure.
Agencv often seems to be taken as a sign that the individual thing
or person is trulv the locus of a superindividual evil and of how
profound an evil. Tn English law, for instance, a cart or other ob-
ject was "deodand", given to God, if it fell on a man when it was
said "nioverc ad iiiorfcin", but not if the man fell upon it." The
Hebrew law established cities of refuge for the accidental slayer. It
is not that he is not a locus of the evil, nor that he ceases to be if he
reach his refuge. He must remain there, an exile until the death of
the high priest, when a new regime renders him no longer danger-
central. A sense of justice to the individual is here in process of
excluding ad\entitious elements from the primitive vie\A' of the
social control of evil. x\nd this process is not by any means com-
plete. Men who are very largely mere loci of vast social evils and
onl\- slightly agents, having been born into involvement in these
evils, are sacrificed to justice, still conceived by the "legal mind" as
an occult force to be balanced or deity to be apj^eased. Yet today
the proved agent of a crime, especiallv if he be a minor, is recog-
nized to be the locus of sui:)erindividual evil, as well as the agent of
particular deeds, and is sentenced to social training rather than to a
"halancing retrilnition.
Tn a second part of this paper, the inextricable relation of indi-
vidual resi>onsibility to social or group responsibility will be clearly
ilkT^trated by tracing the development of the concept of moral evil
in Greek thought. Then by tracing, in Hebrew history, the develop-
ment of the o]:)])osite conception— that of the good—it will be made
to ai)])ear how, from the ])rimitive world-view to Jesus' concep-
tion of the Kingdom of God, the religious motive—reallv the motive
of social responsibility—maintained itself as the ground of ethics,
carrying individual responsibility with it as an implication, at first
ol)scurely, at last quite clearly.
"Westcrmarck. Op. Cit.. Vol. I, p, 264.
